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INTRODUCTION
The legal personality of international organizations is a classic but always
topical and complex theme in international law, a theme to which a remark-
able number of works have been dedicated and which continues to attract the
attention of governments, international organizations themselves, and schol-
ars.1 It is nowadays undisputed that international organizations may possess
legal personality in international law – although not identical to that of states
– as well as in national legal systems. It is equally undisputed that international
organizations may conclude international treaties, bring and receive interna-
tional claims, send and receive legations, and enjoy privileges and immunities
before national courts. However, many questions still remain unsettled or
controversial, including how an international organization acquires interna-
tional legal personality; in what such a personality is different from that of
states; and how the responsibility for internationally wrongful acts is to be
allocated between the organization and its members.
This chapter discusses the process through which an international organi-
zation may acquire international legal personality and the main features of
such a personality. It also touches upon issues of international responsibility
and immunities that are fully treated elsewhere in this book. It finally deals
with the legal personality international organizations may enjoy within the
jurisdiction of member and non-member states.
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The traditional departing point to discuss the international legal personality of
international organizations is the Reparation for Injuries advisory opinion
delivered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1949. After observing
that ‘the subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical’, the
Court held that the United Nations possessed international legal personality and
could bring an international claim against another subject of international law.2
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Both the premise and the conclusion are nowadays undisputed not only
with regard to the United Nations but in general. The argument developed by
the Court, nevertheless, is to a large extent circular as ‘the ICJ inferred from
the specific powers bestowed on the UN that it had international personality
and then went on to deduce from the existence of such personality that it had
the specific power to bring an international claim for one of its officials’.3
Almost 60 years later, the concept of international legal personality remains
rather a nebulous one4 and there is still no satisfactory definition of interna-
tional legal personality.5 In 1949 the Court noted that this is a ‘doctrinal
expression’ (Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations, 1949: 178) and provided a partial definition by observing that the
United Nations ‘is a subject of international law and capable of possessing
international rights and duties, and that it has the capacity to maintain its rights
by bringing international claims’ (Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the
Service of the United Nations, 1949: 179). Yet, according to the current stan-
dard definition, ‘[h]aving international legal personality for an international
organization means possessing rights, duties, powers and liabilities etc. as
distinct from its members or its creators on the international plane and in inter-
national law’ (Amerasinghe, 2005: 78).
The risk of circularity of the definition of international legal personality is
reflected also in the following passage elaborated from the standpoint of the
responsibility of international organizations: ‘Norms of international law
cannot impose on an entity “primary” obligations or “secondary” obligations
in case of a breach of one of the “primary” obligations unless that entity has
legal personality under international law. Conversely, an entity has to be
regarded as a subject of international law even if only a single obligation is
imposed on it under international law.’6
MAIN THEORIES ON ACQUISITION OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL PERSONALITY
Two main schools of thought have emerged as to how an international orga-
nization acquires international legal personality. Curiously, both rely to a
certain extent on the Reparation for Injuries advisory opinion.
According to the so-called will theory, the crucial element is the intention
of its founders to create a new subject of international law. This may be
expressly established in the constituent instrument – which is normally a treaty
– or be inferred from it if there is no specific provision. From this perspective,
international organizations possess international legal personality ‘because the
status is given to them, either explicitly or, if there is no constitutional attri-
bution of this quality, implicitly’.7 Accordingly, the legal personality enjoyed
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by the organization derives from the will of its members contained in the
constitutive instrument.8 Kelsen is one of the leading advocates of this theory.
For him, ‘[a]n international community possesses juridical personality in the
field of international law if the treaty constituting the community confers upon
its organs the competence to exercise certain functions in relation to the
members and especially the power to enter into international agreements
establishing duties, rights and competences of the community’ (Kelsen, 1951:
329).
There are two main problems with this theory. First, it postulates that the
international organization has been effectively created and is functioning as
intended. Second, making the international personality of the organization
dependent on the will of the founders is problematic with regard to the rela-
tionship between the organization and non-members. Relying on recognition
by non-member states would not only contradict the essence of the theory, but
also scarcely be useful considering that the shortcomings and controversial
aspects of recognition of states would only be amplified in the case of recog-
nition of international organizations.
For the so-called objective theory, on the contrary, the question is a factual
one as ‘it is not the provisions of the constitution or the intention of its framers
which establish the international personality of a state or an intergovernmen-
tal organization, but the objective fact of its existence’ (Seyersted, 1964a:
39–40). From this perspective, the legal personality of international organiza-
tions is – like that of states – original. The distinct will (volonté distincte) of
the organization, which is the essence of the theory, however, has not been
fully elucidated and remains to a large extent a legal fiction. Not even the
adoption of binding decisions by majority would be an irrefutable proof of
such a distinct will. Yet, nothing prevents member states from establishing an
organization deprived of international legal personality and accepting
nonetheless that its organs – which are to be considered as common organs of
the member states – can adopt binding decisions by a majority vote.
There is however no need to overstate the opposition of the two theories.
On the contrary they have elements that are not necessarily mutually exclu-
sive. Several authors have overcome the doctrinal debate by defining a set of
criteria that the organization must satisfy in order to acquire international legal
personality. In this perspective, the following elements have been identified:
(a) a permanent association of states equipped with organs; (b) a distinction,
in terms of legal powers and purposes, between the organization and its
members; (c) the existence of legal powers exercisable on the international
level.9
Alternatively, it has been suggested that ‘as soon as the organization
performs acts which can be explained only on the basis of international legal
personality, such an organization will be presumed to be in possession of
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international legal personality’.10 The theory relies on the Reparation for
Injuries advisory opinion, fully appreciates its manifold reasoning but seems
to have inherited from it some degree of circularity too. The theory is based
on a rebuttable presumption created by the concrete performance of acts by the
organization as legal person on the international level. However, it is not clear
who can challenge such a presumption, what are the consequences of a
successful challenge, and how the acts performed by the organization could be
explained and attributed from the standpoint of international responsibility.11
THE ACQUISITION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
PERSONALITY AS A PROCESS
It is submitted that the acquisition of international legal personality by inter-
national organizations is a process ignited by the intention of the contracting
parties to create a new subject of international law.12 An expression of will by
some subjects of international law is indispensable – yet not sufficient.13 Such
an expression of will does not necessarily need to take the form of an interna-
tional treaty. When it does, the intention of the contracting parties can be
expressly declared in a specific provision of the treaty or be inferred from the
treaty itself.14
The constituent instrument normally defines the powers of the future orga-
nization (see below, the section Nature of international legal personality). It
remains nonetheless an act between the contracting parties and as such it
imposes rights and obligations exclusively upon them. They have agreed to
create a permanent organization equipped with organs (Quadri, 1968: 531) and
to accept the acts and decisions of the organization once established
(Reuterswärd, 1980: 17). At the same time, they are also the holders of the
corresponding subjective rights and in particular the right to request other
contracting parties to take the measures agreed upon to create the organization
and to respect its acts and decisions.
Although the contracting parties have agreed to confer to the international
organization certain powers,15 at this stage, the international legal personality
of the international organization is only potential (Kasme, 1960: 31). Yet,
‘[e]ven if a treaty provision were intended to confer international personality
on a particular organization, the acquisition of legal personality would depend
on the actual establishment of the organization. It is clear that an organization
merely existing on paper cannot be considered a subject of international law’
(Gaja, 2003: 11). The constitutive instrument is only the legal basis upon
which the organization could materially be established (Arangio-Ruiz, 1997:
15).
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Article 281 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC;
since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty Article 47 TEU), for instance,
is one of the rare examples of treaty provisions providing for international legal
personality.16 The majority of the constitutive instruments of international
organizations do not contain an express provision on their international legal
personality. The intention of the founders to create such an organization,
however, can be inferred from the constitutive instrument as in the case of the
United Nations. The Charter is silent on the matter, but a number of its provi-
sions, including Articles 41, 42, 43, 63 and 75 reveal that the founders intended
to establish an organization possessing international legal personality.17
Both the TEC and the Charter were the material basis upon which the would-
be members agreed to establish the organization and bestow it with certain
powers. This was necessary but not sufficient. There was no guarantee that
contracting parties would have complied with their obligations18 and that the
organization would ever exercise its powers independently from its members.
Thus, it is only through the concrete exercise of these powers that the inter-
national organization may acquire international legal personality, provided it
is able to affirm itself as an entity distinct and independent from the contract-
ing parties – now members. Similarly to the personality of other subjects of
international law, the international personality of international organizations is
ultimately a matter of fact. It derives from the emergence of ‘an entity materi-
ally able – in certain matters – to act and to manifest a will in such condition
of independence as to distinguish itself from any other international person’.19
From this perspective, the acquisition of international legal personality by an
international organization is based – like any other subject of international law
– on customary international law. Accordingly, such a personality must be
considered as primary since it is not the legal effect of its constituent instru-
ment.20 The international organization will enjoy international personality on
the same footing as states without altering the horizontal structure of the inter-
national community.21
This is compatible with the Reparation for Injuries advisory opinion.22 The
Court held that ‘practice – in particular the conclusion of conventions to
which the organization is a party – has confirmed this character of the organi-
zation, which occupies a position in certain respects in detachment of its
members’ and that ‘the organization was intended to exercise and enjoy, and
is in fact exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which can only be
explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of international
personality and the capacity to operate upon an international plane’.23
Whether an international organization possesses international legal
personality, consequently, must be ascertained by assessing its performance,
as an entity distinct from its member states, of acts in the international legal
order. Yet, this is just another application of the principle of effectiveness that
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characterizes the whole international legal order. Like states, international
organizations become subjects of international law when they are capable of
participating in international legal relations in conditions of independence.
Unlike the case of states, however, such a capacity is not coupled with the
effective and permanent exercise of sovereign powers over a given territory
and population, and normally manifest itself only in the relationships with
other subjects of international law.
EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
PERSONALITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The question whether an international organization possesses international
legal personality can be solved only through the analysis of its practice, bear-
ing in mind that such legal personality is not the inevitable consequence of the
creation of an international organization (ILA Report, 1998: 604). Such an
analysis is conducted primarily by international and national tribunals as well
as by states – whether member or not of the organization – and other organi-
zations. There is no guarantee that the outcome will be consistent. Quite the
contrary, the risk of divergences and legal uncertainty is unavoidable. This is
not peculiar to international organizations and indeed can also concern the
legal status of territorial entities.24 Rather, it can be attributed to the horizon-
tal structure of the international legal order.
International Responsibility
The most reliable test to ascertain the international legal personality of a given
organization remains the acceptance of international responsibility for acts
committed by its organs, and, conversely, the bringing of international claims
for allegedly unlawful acts committed by other subjects in violations of its
rights.25 These are manifestations – rather than consequences – of the interna-
tional legal personality of the organization. Yet, international personality is to
be inferred from international responsibility, not the other way around
(Quadri, 1968: 534–5; Giardina, 1964: 177).
The United Nations is clearly one of the best examples of international
organizations capable of bringing and receiving claims against or from other
subjects of international law. The Reparation for Injuries advisory opinion is
extraordinary in seizing in the international claim advanced by the United
Nations with regard to Count Bernadotte one of the first manifestations of the
United Nations as subject of international law able to express a will distinct
from its members and to independently enter into legal relationships with
other subjects of international law.
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The United Nations has also accepted international responsibility on a
number of occasions, especially in respect of unlawful acts committed in the
context of peacekeeping operations.26 It has been observed that ‘[a]s a
subsidiary organ of the United Nations, an act of a peacekeeping force is, in
principle, imputable to the Organization, and if committed in violation of an
international obligation entails the international responsibility of the
Organization and its liability in compensation’.27
Another valuable example is the European Community. The organization is
not merely a forum for member states to discuss and organize their mutual
relations. It is an actor on the international plane that has assumed interna-
tional responsibility in relation to the obligations and sought respect for the
rights falling within its own areas of competence, and has participated both as
claimant and respondent in international disputes, particularly within the
framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO).28
The European Community has fully manifested its international legal
personality, on the one hand, by accepting responsibility for international
wrongful acts, either exclusively or jointly with its members, and, on the other
hand, by asserting its rights through the remedies available in international law
including, when applicable, resort to international tribunals.
It has taken responsibility with regard to violations of the obligations stem-
ming from its membership – alongside with each of its members – to the
WTO. It has accepted exclusive responsibility in areas where there had been a
transfer of sovereignty from the members to the organization. In European
Communities – Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, for
instance, the European Community asserted that responsibility for infringe-
ments of the obligations related to the tariff concessions was entirely its own
and not of the two member states involved in the dispute.29 Leaving aside the
procedural issue of the dispute, what is important for the purpose of this chap-
ter is that, on the one hand, the United States held the European Communities
responsible for the alleged breaches of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) obligations, and on the other hand that the European
Community was ready to accept responsibility.
The European Community has also accepted responsibility, this time
jointly with its members, with regard to the obligations imposed by mixed
treaties like those concluded between the Community and its member states on
the one hand and the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states on the other
hand.30 As confirmed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), in the absence
of derogations expressly laid down in a given treaty, ‘the Community and its
member states as partners of the ACP states are jointly liable to those latter
states for the fulfilment of every obligation arising from the commitments
undertaken, including those relating to financial assistance’ (Parliament v.
Council, 1994: I–625, 661–662).
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The picture is different in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). The exclusive attribution to the members of an organi-
zation for acts committed during the military intervention in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia carried out within the framework of the organization
militates against the international legal personality of the organization. The
events related to the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade
that occurred on 7 May 1999 are an interesting example.31 Although NATO
immediately expressed its regrets and opened an investigation on the matter,
it was the United States – the national state of the aircraft that carried out the
air strike – that in the following months entered into bilateral negotiations with
China. The offer of immediate ex gratia payments to the victims made by the
United States (US State Department, Report on Accidental Bombing of
Chinese Embassy, 1999) was finalized on 16 December 1999 when the two
governments signed an agreement providing for compensation damages in
favour of China (Press Statement of 16 December 1999 of the US State
Department). In the same direction seem to point the arrangements related to
the international responsibility for unlawful acts committed by IFOR/SFOR in
Bosnia-Herzegovina (Guillaume, 1997) and KFOR in Kosovo.32
International Treaties
The conclusion of treaties is another important indicator of the international
legal personality of international organizations. The act may represent a mani-
festation of the distinct will of the organization, which is the essence of its
international personality. The treaty, accordingly, may create and modify the
international rights and obligations between the organization and possibly its
members on the one side, and the other contracting party or parties on the
other side.
It must, however, be noted that nothing prevents an international organiza-
tion deprived of international legal personality from concluding international
treaties. In this case, the organ of the organization is to be considered as
common organ of the member states and its acts as acts jointly performed by
the member states. The treaty therefore produces its effects with regard to the
member states on the one side, and the other contracting party or parties on the
other side.33 The treaty concluded between the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – an organization, which is generally consid-
ered as not possessing international legal personality – and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in 1998 is a case in point.34
Moreover, the importance of headquarter agreements is rather limited as
normally they provide for the legal personality in the domestic legal system of
the host state, regardless of its membership in the organization (Gaja, 2003:
109). In other words, they govern the legal rights and obligations within the
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jurisdiction of the host state and as such regard the domestic legal personality
of the organization that is quite independent from its international legal
personality (see below, the section Legal personality in domestic law).
For the purpose of establishing the international legal personality of an
organization, more important than the conclusion of treaties is compliance
with the obligations imposed and the enjoyment of the rights granted thereby.
Of course, the issue of implementation is intimately related to that of the inter-
national responsibility for breaches of the treaties.
The treaties concluded by the European Community are illustrative as they
can be implemented either jointly by the organization and its members or
exclusively by the organization depending of the repartition of competences
within the European Community. In Kupferberg, the ECJ held that it was for
both the Community institutions and the member states to ensure compliance
with the obligations arising from the Free Trade Agreement between the
European Community and Portugal (Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg
& Cie KG a.A., 1982).
By way of contrast, it has been observed that ‘[given] the “vertical” struc-
ture of the EC system as it concerns the authorities of the member states
(customs administration) acting as implementing authorities of EC law in a
field of exclusive Community competence [the] EC took the view that the
actions of these authorities should be attributed to the EC itself and empha-
sised its readiness to assume responsibility for all measures within the partic-
ular field of tariff concessions, be they taken at EC level or at that of the
member states’.35
Immunities
Immunities are also often referred to as an indicator of the international legal
personality of international organizations.36 From the perspective of the inter-
national organization, claiming immunity may be the confirmation of its inter-
national legal personality. From the perspective of the tribunal, refraining
from exercising jurisdiction may be the result of the application to the organi-
zation as subject of international law of the principle par in parem non habet
jurisdictionem.
Yet, this is not necessarily the case and the enjoyment of immunities is
rather an unreliable indicator of the international legal personality of interna-
tional organizations. In this context, international organizations are not inter-
acting with other subjects of international law on the international level – as in
the case of international responsibility or conclusion of treaties – but rather
seeking immunity from jurisdiction in a given state.
A state may be obliged under an international agreement to grant immunity
to the organization. The overwhelming majority of international organizations,
Personality of international organizations 41
most of which do not claim international legal personality, have concluded
headquarter agreements or other agreements governing privileges and immu-
nities. As a result, disputes normally arise in states that have concluded such
an agreement with the concerned organization. In this case, the decision of the
municipal tribunal will depend on the content of the treaty and its status in
domestic law. In the absence of such an agreement or when the agreement
cannot be applied by the tribunal due to domestic rules, it can be argued that
the state is still obliged under customary law to refrain from exercising juris-
diction due to the international legal personality of the organization.37
Whether an international organization is immune from jurisdiction in a
given state ultimately hinges on the domestic law of that state. As held in
League of Arab States v. T., ‘jurisdictional immunity has the effect of depriv-
ing the courts normally competent under domestic law of their power to exer-
cise jurisdiction over the claim’.38
Depending on the rules governing the relationship between international
law and domestic law in force in the concerned state, the adoption of a domes-
tic measure may be indispensable to grant immunity to the organization and to
comply with an international obligation. Until such a measure has been
adopted, domestic courts may exercise their jurisdiction, although this may
imply the commission by the state of an international wrongful act.
However, international organizations do not necessarily have to possess
international legal personality in order to be immune from jurisdiction. Indeed,
a state may certainly grant immunity to an international organization not
possessing international legal personality by treating the organization as a
collectivity of states and its organs as common organs through which member
states perform jointly certain acts. Assuming that these acts committed indi-
vidually by each member state would have attracted immunity under interna-
tional law, it is logical for a tribunal to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction
when they are performed collectively through an international organization.39
In Cristiani v. Italian Latin-American Institute, the Italian Court of
Cassation admitted that ‘neither the doctrine nor the jurisprudence reflect any
discernible communis opinio as to the requisite correlation between interna-
tional legal personality and immunity’. It then held that ‘whatever the basis of
jurisdictional immunity may be, generally it is recognized by the doctrine and
jurisprudence that it may be relied upon by union of states, either when they
enjoy legal personality or when they form a collectivity of states’ (Cristiani v.
Italian Latin-American Institute, 1985, 1992: 24–5).
A clear confirmation that immunity from jurisdiction does not necessarily
depend on whether the organization possesses international legal personality40
is the OSCE, an organization that although deprived of international legal
personality is entitled to immunity from jurisdiction in the member states. The
recent Swiss law on privileges and immunities granted by Switzerland as host
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state, for instance, applies to organizations, entities and individuals regardless
of their international legal status.41 Significantly, in the message to the
Parliament, the government introduced a distinction between international
organizations and international institutions and maintained that only the
former possess international legal personality. It pointed out that ‘[l]’organi-
sation intergouvernementale dispose toujours de la personnalité juridique
internationale, qui lui est conférée par le traité international qui la crée. Tel
n’est pas le cas de l’institution internationale qui jouit toutefois d’une place
particulière dans les relations internationales. Nous pouvons citer comme
exemples des institutions telles que l’Organisation pour la sécurité et la
coopération en Europe (OSCE) […]’.42
Indeed, international organizations deprived of such personality may still
be entitled to immunity from jurisdiction. Whether and to what extent this is
the case depends on the relevant rules of international law and ultimately on
the domestic law of the concerned state.
NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY
The question of the international personality of international organizations
calls for a yes or no answer.43 It must be kept distinct from the question of the
powers the organization can exercise. In this respect, it has been pointed out
that ‘[w]hile it may be true that considerations of functional necessity limit an
organization’s capacities or even competence to perform certain acts, that does
not change the fact that it is a subject of international law’.44
In the European Road Transport Agreement decision, the ECJ made an
important distinction between the ‘capacity’ and the ‘authority’ of the
European Community to conclude international agreements. The former stems
from its international legal personality, whereas the latter is determined by
relevant primary and secondary EC Law.45
It is undisputed that the legal personality enjoyed by international organi-
zations is not identical to that enjoyed by states. The two main differences are
that international organizations lack general competence and do not exercise
in a permanent manner governmental powers over a given population and
territory.
As pointed out by the ICJ, ‘international organizations are subjects of inter-
national law which do not, unlike states, possess a general competence.
International organizations are governed by the ‘principle of speciality’, that
is to say, they are invested by the states which create them with powers, the
limits of which are a function of the common interests whose promotion those
states entrust to them’ (Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in
Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996: 66, 78).
Personality of international organizations 43
Although the powers of international organizations are discussed in detail
elsewhere,46 it is worth noting that the powers of an international organization
are defined in the first place by its constituent instrument or the expression of
will upon which the organization has been created.47 However, the constituent
instrument must be interpreted taking into account not only any subsequent
agreements between all members but also subsequent practice. Yet, the
powers defined in the constituent treaty may be informally modified through
subsequent practice by the generality of the member states.48 Such a possibil-
ity is widely accepted, especially with regard to the UN Charter49 as conse-
quential to the fact that contracting parties remain ‘the transaction’s exclusive
and absolute domini’.50
Furthermore, it has been the consistent position of the ICJ that the United
Nations ‘must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly
provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as
being essential to the performance of its duties’.51 The so-called implied
powers doctrine has gained general acceptance, although it must be kept in
mind that it is ‘designed to implement within reasonable limitations, and not
to supplant or vary, expressed powers’.52
The powers of the organization, nonetheless, are not defined exclusively
and permanently by its constituent instrument supplemented by subsequent
practice. It has been observed that ‘[o]ne or more states may also purport to
confer additional powers on an organization on an ad hoc basis by use of a
treaty that is separate from the constituent treaty’ (Sarooshi, 2005: 19).
Finally, although international organizations lack a permanent territorial
basis, they may in exceptional cases administer territories and exercise
governmental powers over them. The temporary exercise of governmental
powers by the United Nations in Cambodia, East Timor and Kosovo are cases
in point.53
LEGAL PERSONALITY IN DOMESTIC LAW
Completely different and independent from – although not unrelated to – inter-
national legal personality is the legal personality international organizations
may enjoy within the jurisdiction of a state. Such a legal personality includes
the capacity to contract, acquire and dispose of property, to institute legal
proceedings and to perform any other legal act as necessary for the fulfilment
of the organization’s functions.54
Domestic legal personality does not presuppose international legal person-
ality nor is it a necessary consequence thereof.55 On the one hand, states may
confer domestic legal personality to an international organization irrespective
of its condition in international law.56 On the other hand, international organi-
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zations that possess international legal personality do not automatically enjoy
legal personality within the jurisdiction of states, nor even those of states that
are members of the organization.
A state may be obliged under international law to confer domestic person-
ality to an international organization. Such an obligation is often imposed by
the constitutive treaty of the organization upon the member states. It can also
stem from a headquarter agreement or an agreement on immunities and privi-
leges concluded by member or non-member states. However, the obligation
remains independent from the international legal personality the organization
may enjoy. As pointed out by the Italian Court of Cassation ‘the provision in
an international agreement of the obligation to recognize legal personality to
an organization and the implementation by law of that provision only mean
that the organization acquires legal personality under the municipal law of the
contracting states’.57
In the absence of a provision in the relevant instruments, it is generally
accepted that member states are obliged under customary law to grant domes-
tic legal personality to international organizations.58 This is certainly the case
of the host state – regardless of its membership to the organization – since as
a matter of fact the organization cannot function without possessing domestic
legal personality, at least to the extent this is necessary for the fulfilment of its
functions (Kunz, 1949: 849).
At any rate, an international organization can be granted domestic legal
personality not in order to comply with an international obligation but on the
basis of a political commitment or even expedience. This is the position, for
instance, of the United Kingdom with regard to the OSCE.59
Regardless of the existence of an international obligation, however, the posi-
tion of the organization within the jurisdiction of each state continues to be
determined by the domestic law of the concerned state.60 Clearly, if such an
obligation exists and the state does not comply with it, it would commit an
international wrongful act and incur international responsibility. Yet, ‘[f]or a
national court, confronted with the issue of the domestic legal personality of an
international organization, it is a rule of domestic law that determines the legal
status of such an entity within the domestic legal sphere’ (Reinisch, 2000: 46).
Depending on the constitutional or other rules on the relation between
municipal and international law, domestic legal capacity of international orga-
nizations may derive directly from the relevant treaty or may require the enact-
ment of domestic measures. Hence, ‘national legal systems will have their
own techniques and methods of determining whether an international organi-
zation has legal personality which is effective in those respective systems’
(Amerasinghe, 2005: 69).
In jurisdictions where international treaties are part of the law of the land
without the enactment of any domestic act being necessary, the ratification of
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the agreement imposing upon members the obligation to ensure that the orga-
nization possess domestic legal personality is sufficient. In Balfour, Guthrie &
Co. Ltd et al. v. United States et al., for instance, a US District Court held that
the United Nations possessed legal personality in the United States and as such
could institute legal proceeding by virtue of Article 104 of the Charter.61
On the contrary, in jurisdictions where an internal act is indispensable to give
effect to international treaties in municipal law, the international organization
does not possess domestic legal personality until such an act has been adopted. In
JH Rayner Ltd v. Department of Trade and Industry, for instance, the House of
Lords held that ‘[w]ithout the Order in Council the I.T.C. had no legal existence
in the law of the United Kingdom […] What brought it into being into English
law was the Order in Council and it is the Order in Council, a purely domestic
measure, in which the constitution of the legal persona is to be found’.62
The domestic legal personality of an organization in a non-member state
may be more problematic. Several decisions admit that, in the absence of an
ad hoc agreement between the international organization and the concerned
non-member state – followed where necessary by appropriate domestic
measures – an international organization possesses domestic legal personality
if it has been incorporated in at least one foreign state. This may be explained
in terms of comity63 or by resorting to the rules of private international law.64
CONCLUSIONS
A few questions concerning the legal personality of international organiza-
tions are undisputed whereas many others remain controversial. It is generally
accepted that international organizations may possess legal personality both in
international law and domestic law. Several theories have been put forward as
to how an international organization becomes subject of international law. It
has been argued in this chapter that this occurs through a process set off by
some states or other subjects of international law, and culminating with the
emergence of the organization as an independent subject capable of entering
into legal relationships on the international plan.
Bringing and receiving international claims as well as implementing inter-
national treaties are the typical and intimately related manifestations – rather
than the consequences – of such a personality. Indeed, the question of inter-
national legal personality is important essentially from the standpoint of the
responsibility for internationally wrongful acts committed by or against the
organization. As such, it has practical relevance only for a handful of interna-
tional organizations, namely those that may carry out military operations,
exercise governmental powers over a territory, or generally perform activities
that may engage their international responsibility.
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Neither the conclusion of treaties nor the enjoyment of immunities are reli-
able tests for the international legal personality of international organizations.
On the one hand, an organization deprived of international personality may
conclude international treaties. In this case the organ of the organization acts
as common organ of the member states whereas the treaty produces its effects
vis-à-vis the member states and the other contracting party.
On the other hand, a state can grant immunity to an organization that does
not possess international legal personality or might even be obliged to do so
under a treaty. Under customary international law, moreover, the principle par
in parem non habet jurisdictionem may operate not only when the interna-
tional organization is considered as a subject of international law, but also
when the organization is merely the instrument through which several states
collectively engage in a certain conduct. In any case, however, the real ques-
tion is whether the acts committed by an international organization attract
immunity from the perspective of the distinction between acts jure imperii and
jure gestionis.
Finally, there is no direct relationship between international legal personal-
ity and domestic legal personality: an international organization may possess
international but not domestic personality, or the other way around.
International law may impose upon a state the obligation to ensure than an
international organization – regardless of its international status – possesses
legal personality within its jurisdiction. Furthermore, nothing prevents a state
from conferring domestic legal personality to an organization deprived of
personality in international law. Indeed this has occurred quite frequently. The
crux of the matter, however, remains the domestic law of the concerned state,
and particularly its provisions on the relationship between international and
domestic law.
NOTES
1. The most referred to general studies on international organizations include: D.W. Bowett
(1982), H.G. Schermers and N.M. Blokker (1995), P. Sands and P. Klein (2001), J. Klabbers
(2009), N.D. White (2005), C.F. Amerasinghe (2005).
2. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory opinion, ICJ
Reports (1949: 174). In Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the
WHO and Egypt, Advisory opinion (1980: 90), the Court confirmed that ‘international
Organisations are subjects of international law and, as such, are bound by any obligations
incumbent upon them under general rules of international law’.
3. A. Reinisch (2000: 55). See also D.W. Bowett (1982: 337), P. Sands and P. Klein (2001:
473), N.D. White (2005: 44). As noted by B. Conforti (2000: 115), this is partly due to the
formulation of the question posed by the General Assembly.
4. N.D. White (2005: 32), J. Klabbers (2009: 51), further observes that ‘personality in interna-
tional law, like “subjectivity”, is but a descriptive notion: useful to describe a state of affairs,
but normatively empty, as neither rights nor obligations flow automatically from a grant of
personality’.
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5. According to E. Lauterpacht (1976: 403) ‘there is no definition of personality in interna-
tional law which is sufficiently comprehensive to apply in some constructive or realistic way
to all the different types of entity which operate in the international field’. See also M.
Mendelson (2005: 371).
6. G. Gaja (2003: 8). According to C. Dominicé (1995: 19), ‘[c]e n’est pas parce qu’une
personne ou entité est destinataire de normes juridiques qu’elle devient sujet de droit. C’est
parce qu’elle a la qualité de sujet de droit que des normes juridiques peuvent lui conférer des
droits ou lui imposer des obligations’.
7. Schermers and Blokker (1995: para. 1565); italics as in the original.
8. In European Molecular Biology Laboratory v. Germany (1990: 20) it was held that ‘[i]nter-
national organizations were not original, but derived subjects of public international law.
Their status therefore had to be determined by reference to the establishing and headquar-
ters agreements’.
9. I. Brownlie (2008: 677). The ILA Committee on Accountability of International
Organizations (1998: 604–5) indicated the following criteria: (a) the provision [in the consti-
tutive instrument] of particular powers, either expressly or by way of necessary implication
from the grant of functions to the organization, (b) the possession by the organization of a
certain level of capacity or competence to press its own claims internationally, as distinct
from the separate claim of its members, (c) the capacity to enter into international agree-
ments in its own right, and (d) the ability of organs of the organization to take decisions by
majority voting.
10. J. Klabbers (2009: 49–50). The theory is fully developed and applied to the European Union
in the same author’s ‘Presumptive Personality: The European Union in International Law’,
in M. Koskenniemi (1998: 231).
11. The ILA Report (1998: 605), conceded that ‘[t]he criteria for […] third party level of inter-
national personality are rather unclear […] one may need to consider whether there is a
presumption in favour of objective personality for all international organizations which have
international personality and if so, how that operates and under which conditions may it be
rebutted’.
12. The term ‘contracting parties’ here refers to the subjects – states or international organizations
– that have taken legal commitments towards the creation of an international organization.
13. The mere inclusion in a treaty of a provision on the international legal personality of the
organization bears little relevance unless it is followed by concrete action. See for instance
Article 18 of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, according to which the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes has full international legal personality. Its inclusion was dictated by the
desire of contracting parties to create ‘a wholly separate and distinct entity, particularly with
regard to the World Bank’, as stressed by the Chairman of the Conference (Documents
Concerning the Origin and the Formulation of the Convention, Washington, 1968, vol. II, p.
380). See also C. Schreuer (2001: 67–68).
14. As observed by N.D. White (2005: 33) ‘there is no need for an express provision in the
constituent treaty of the organization for it to have personality’.
15. On the conferral by states of powers to international organizations, see D. Sarooshi (2005).
16. It reads: ‘The Community Union shall have legal personality’. In France v. Council (1994:
para. 24) the ECJ held that ‘the Community alone, having legal personality pursuant to
Article 210 [later Article 281 of the Treaty, now Article 47 TEU] […] has the capacity to bind
itself by concluding agreements with a non-member country or an international organization’.
A provision identical to Art. 281 was included in the Constitution for Europe (2004: Article
I-7). In the Final Report dated 1 October 2002, the Working Group III on Legal Personality
of the European Union endorsed the view that the European Union legal personality should
replace the existing legal personalities of the Communities (2002: paras 8 ff.).
17. At the San Francisco Conference, the proposal to expressly state that the United Nations
possesses international legal personality (Doc. 2 G/7 (k) (1), in 3 UNCIO 343) was rejected
in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding on the nature of the organization, see the
position of the United States, in Department of State, Report to the President on the Results
of the San Francisco Conference (1945: 157–8).
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18. See the failed attempt to establish the International Trade Organization in 1948, although
article 89 of its draft constitutive instrument expressly provided for international legal
personality. It is worthwhile noting that some of the key provisions of the Charter, namely
Article 43 and following, have remained dead letter.
19. G. Arangio-Ruiz (1979: 246 ff). See also R. Quadri (1968: 531).
20. G. Arangio-Ruiz (1950: especially p. 73 ff). See also, by the same author, the works referred
to above (1979, 1997). According to F. Seyersted (1964a: 100), international organizations
become ‘general subjects of international law, ipso facto on the basis of general and custom-
ary international law, in basically the same manner as States’. According to C. Dominicé
(1984: 163) ‘une organisation interétatique est dotée de la personnalité juridique interna-
tionale en vertu du droit international général lorsqu’elle réunit un ensemble de critères
objectifs’.
21. That the United Nations is not a super-state was held by the ICJ in Reparation for Injuries,
(1949: 179). In this sense also the Report to the President (1945). In literature, see G.
Arangio-Ruiz (1997).
22. G.G. Fitzmaurice (1952: 4) noted that in the Reparation for Injuries ‘the Court found in
effect […] that the international personality of the Organization was a question of fact’ and
concluded that ‘the existence of international personality as an objective fact is […] capable
of producing consequences outside the confines of the Organization’.
23. Reparation for Injuries (1949: 179) (Italics added). According to G. Gaja (2003: 11) ‘[t]he
entity […] needs to have acquired a sufficient independence from its members so that it
cannot be regarded as acting as an organ common to the members. When such an indepen-
dent entity comes into being, one could speak of an ‘objective international personality’, as
the Court did in its advisory opinion on Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the
United Nations. The characterization of an organization as a subject of international law thus
appears as a question of fact’.
24. The Republic of China – Taiwan, Republika Srpska and Kosovo are just but a few examples
of controversial territorial entities.
25. This is without prejudice to the co-existence and co-ordination of international responsibil-
ity of member states. On the question, which is beyond the purpose of this chapter, see N.M.
Blokker, Chapter 12 in this volume. See also G. Gaja (2004: 3 ff.); ILA Committee of the
International Law Association on Accountability of International Organizations (2004: 797).
26. The United Nations, for instance, accepted responsibility for the acts carried out during the
military operations carried out in Congo and settled the related claims through a series of
agreements (535 UNTS 191, 564 UNTS 193, 565 UNTS 3, 585 UNTS 147, 588 UNTS 197).
See also A. Di Blase (1974: 250). On the complex question of attribution of international
personality in operations in which more organizations are involved, see G. Gaja (2009: 8 ff)
and the cases and articles referred to.
27. Unpublished letter of 3 February 2004 by the United Nations Legal Counsel to the Director
of the Codification Division, quoted in 56 YBILC (2004) 112. In his report to the General
Assembly dated 20 September 1996 (para. 17), the Secretary General admitted that ‘[t]he
international responsibility of the United Nations for combat-related activities of United
Nations forces is premised on the assumption that the operation in question is under the
exclusive command and control of the United Nations’.
28. Intervention of the Representative of the European Community before the United Nations
General Assembly, Sixth Committee, 27 October 2003, A/C.6/58/SR.
29. Report of the Panel, 5 February 1998 (paras 4.9 to 4.15). As noted by P. Koutrakos (2006:
177) ‘the ambiguities and complexity of determining competence have not seriously chal-
lenged the ability of the Community to act within the WTO structure’.
30. Similarly, the European Community considers itself responsible alongside its member states
with regard to breaches of the obligations deriving from Trade-Related aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and TRIPS agreements. This reflected the concurrent
competence of the organization and its members in these areas, see European Court of
Justice, Opinion 1/94 (1994: I-5267).
31. The episode refutes the conclusion reached by E. Stein and D. Carreau (1968: 602), accord-
ing to whom ‘NATO has evolved into an international organization endowed with its own
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international personality and legal order, possessing an extensive, complex institutional
machinery, and engaged in activities of common interests that can no longer be imputed to
individual members singly and severally’ (footnote omitted).
32. T. Stein (2002: 181), M. Guillaume (1997: 243). Contra A. Pellet (1997: 193).
33. T. Perassi (1954: 145 ff.) observes that a common organ is simultaneously the organ of all
member states. According to the ILA Report (1998: 603) ‘[w]ithout personality, interna-
tional organizations are no more than collections of members requiring rights, obligations
and powers to be held and used by law by those members’. In Certain Phosphate Lands in
Nauru (Nauru v. Australia) (1992: 240, para. 47) the Court held that ‘the three Governments
mentioned in the Trusteeship Agreement constituted, in the very terms of that Agreement,
“the Administering Authority” for Nauru; that this Authority did not have an international
legal personality distinct from those of the States thus designated’.
34. Agreement on the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (1998). See also OSCE Permanent
Council Decision No. 263 (1998).
35. Information note dated 7 March 2003, attached to a letter from the Director-General of the
Legal Service of the European Commission to the United Nations Legal Counsel (2003: 2),
quoted in G. Gaja (2004: 6).
36. On immunities and privileges, see A. Reinisch, ‘Privileges and Immunities’, Chapter 6 in
this volume.
37. In Iran-US Claims Tribunal v. A.S. (1994: 329) the Netherlands Supreme Court held that
international organizations are entitled under ‘unwritten international law’ to the privilege
of immunity from jurisdiction, at least in the state in whose territory it has its seat. In
Cristiani v. Italian Latin-American Institute (1985, 1992: 26) the Italian Court of Cassation
held that once it is established that an organization possesses legal personality ‘[t]here is no
doubt that it is also entitled to jurisdictional immunity (irrespective of the presence or
absence of treaty provisions explicitly granting that right) pursuant to the rule of customary
international law par in parem non habet jurisdictionem’. See also Food and Agriculture
Organization v. INPDAI (1982, 1992: 6). Contra, Groupement d’entreprises Fougerolle v.
CERN (1992, 1996: 211) where the Swiss Supreme Court held that ‘[t]he jurisdictional
immunity of international organizations is not derived from their international legal person-
ality. Since such organizations, by contrast to States, are not full subject of international law,
their immunity is always based on an instrument of public international law’. In literature,
see A. Reinisch (2000: 145 ff.), H. Fox (2002: 469), I. Brownlie (2008: 680 ff.), G. Gaja
(2003: 11). According to P. Sands and P. Klein (2001: 489), however, ‘it is difficult to argue
that all international organizations are to enjoy privileges and immunities by virtue of a rule
of customary international law’.
38. League of Arab States v. T. (2001, 2005: 96) (italics added). The Court found that Belgian
Courts were entitled to exercise their jurisdiction since the treaty granting immunity was
concluded by the King of Belgium but had not been approved by the Parliament.
39. For the purpose of this chapter suffice it to mention that according to the prevailing view,
international organizations – similarly to states – normally enjoy restricted immunity. In
Food and Agriculture Organization v. INPDAI (1982: 1992) the Court held that ‘[d]octrine
and jurisprudence are mostly oriented towards a concept of restrictive immunity, connected
with the dichotomy between acts jure imperii and jure gestionis, and do not grant immunity
where the foreign body enters into a contract of private law with an Italian National’. In
Iran-US Claims Tribunal v. A.S. (1994: 329), the Netherlands Supreme Court held that
immunity must be granted ‘in respect of all disputes which are immediately connected with
the performance of the tasks entrusted to the organization’. In Groupement d’entreprises
Fougerolle v. CERN (1992, 1996: 211) however, the Swiss Supreme Court held that ‘[i]nter-
national organizations enjoy absolute and complete immunity without any restriction’. See
also Z.M. v. Delegation of Arab League (1993, 2000: 647). A change towards restricted
immunity, however, was prospected by the Swiss Supreme Court in an obiter dictum in A.
SA et consorts v. Conseil federal (2004: 321–2). See A. Reinisch (2000) and ‘Privileges and
Immunities’, Chapter 6 in this volume; E. Gaillard and I. Pingel-Lenuzza (2002).
40. The opposite view has been traditionally held by the Italian Court of Cassation, see, for
instance, Food and Agriculture Organization v. INPDAI (1982, 1992: 6).
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41. Loi fédérale sur les privilèges, les immunités les facilités, ainsi que sur les aides financiers
accordées par la Suisse en tant qu’Etat hôte (2007).
42. Message relatif à la loi fédérale sur les privilèges, les immunités et les facilités, ainsi que sur
les aides financières accordés par la Suisse en tant qu’Etat hôte (Loi sur l’Etat hôte, LEH,
2006: 7617). See also the International Organisations Bill, recently adopted by the United
Kingdom, with explanatory note.
43. See H.G. Schermers and N. Blokker (1995: para. 1570) who rightly criticize the position
expressed in Reparation for Injuries advisory opinion (1949: 179), that the United Nations
possesses ‘a large measure’ of international personality. See also C. Dominicé (1995: 18),
N.D. White (2005: 31–32).
44. P.H.F. Bekker (1994: 57) (italics as in the original).
45. Case 22/70, Commission v. Council (re: ERTA), (1971: especially paras 14–16). For a full
discussion of the case, see P. Koutrakos (2006: 78 ff.). According to P.H.F. Bekker (1994:
51 ff.), international legal personality involves three elements: personality, capacity and
competence.
46. See V. Engström, Chapter 3 in this volume.
47. In the Nuclear Weapons, Advisory opinion (1996: 79), the ICJ pointed out that ‘[t]he powers
conferred on international organizations are normally the subject of an express statement in
their constituent instruments’.
48. According to B. Winiarski, diss. op. in Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17,
paragraph 2 of the Charter), Advisory opinion (1962. 230–231) ‘if a practice is introduced
without opposition in the relations between the contracting parties, this may bring about, at
the end of a certain period, a modification of a treaty rule, but in that event the very process
of the formation of the new rule provides the guarantee of the consent of the parties’.
49. See, for instance, S. Engel (1965: 108), R. Zacklin (1968: 171 ff.)
50. G. Arangio-Ruiz (1979: 284–285, esp. note 183). He also notes that states are ‘the masters
of the existence, of the survival, of the duration of the treaty’s rules and of any rights and
duties deriving therefrom’.
51. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nation (1949: 179). See also
Effects of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal,
Advisory opinion, ICJ Reports (1954: 57), Nuclear Weapons, Advisory opinion (1996: 79).
The later opinion contains a reference to ‘subsidiary powers which are not expressly
provided for in the basic instruments which govern their activities’.
52. G.H. Hackworth, diss. op. in Administrative Tribunal case (1954: 80). In Certain Expenses,
Advisory opinion (1962: 133), France emphasized that ‘[l]es Etats Membres des Nations
Unies ont souscrit, qu’ils soient Membres originaires ou non, aux engagements de la Charte,
mais rien de plus. La Charte est un traité par lequel les Etats n’ont aliéné leur compétence
que dans la stricte mesure ils ont consenti’.
53. See, in particular, S.R. Ratner (1993), C. Stahn (2001).
54. See, for instance: Article 104 of the UN Charter and Article I of the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations; Article IV of the Agreement on the Status
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, National Representatives and International Staff
(1951); Article 282 TEC, Article XII UNESCO.
55. In JH Rayner Ltd v. Department of Trade and Industry (1989, 1990: 708), the International
Tin Council (ITC) was considered as a body that ‘as an international persona, had no status
under the laws of the United Kingdom’. G. Gaja (2003: 11), observes that ‘[l]egal personal-
ity under international law does not necessarily imply legal personality in domestic law. On
the other hand, the absence of legal personality under domestic law does not affect its status
under international law, and hence the possibility that the organization incurs international
responsibility. But see C. Dominicé (1984: 165), according to whom ‘[l]orsqu’une organi-
sation interétatique est dotée de la personnalité juridique internationale, sa capacité juridique
dans les ordres internes n’est que le reflet, la conséquence nécessaire et inéluctable, de sa
qualité de sujet de droit international’. See also G. Marston (1997).
56. A clear example is the OSCE which enjoys legal personality within the United Kingdom on
the basis of the International Organisations Act.
57. Istituto Universitario Europeo v. Piette (1999: 1313), as translated by G. Gaja (2003: 10,
footnote 50).
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58. See, for instance, J.-F. Lalive (1953: 304 ff.). According to P. Reuter (1958: 232) ‘[i]nter-
national organizations that possess international legal personality “have the right to obtain
from the national law of each State the legal status appropriate to the proper exercise of their
functions inside each country”’. For Amerasinghe (2005: 76), the members of the organiza-
tion are probably obliged to grant it legal personality in their respective jurisdiction. P.
Sands and P. Klein (2001: 477), in turn, maintain that ‘[e]ven in the absence of any explicit
instrument or provision of that kind, any international obligation must be deemed to enjoy
an independent legal personality in domestic legal orders, since this will almost always
prove necessary to enable it to discharge its functions on a daily basis’.
59. See International Organisations Act (2005: 11). See also OSCE, ‘Decision on Legal
Capacity and Privileges and Immunities’ (1993) (non legally binding). In literature, see M.
Sapiro (1995: 634–5).
60. On the application of domestic law to international organizations see A. Reinisch (2005: 124
ff.).
61. Balfour, Guthrie & Co. Ltd et al. v. United States et al. (1950: 324). Similarly, in M. v.
Organisation des Nations Unies et Etat Belge (1966, 1972: 450), the Civil Tribunal of
Brussels held that ‘[b]y Article 104 [of the United Nations Charter] the organisation enjoys
in the territory of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary to it’.
62. House of Lords, JH Rayner Ltd v. Department of Trade and Industry (1989, 1990: 712). In
Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim (1991: 10), it was held that ‘[t]he Tin Council reaffirmed
that the English courts cannot identify and allow actions by international organisations
which sovereign states by treaty agree to bring into existence’. Such an effect by the Order
in Council derives from the International Organisations Act 1968. Alternatively, the inter-
national organization can acquire domestic personality through the enactment of a piece of
legislation.
63. See, for instance, Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim (1991: 12); In Re Hashim and Others
(1995, 1997: 424 ff.).
64. See, for instance, H.G. Schermers and N.M. Blokker (1995: 999–1000). For a sceptical view
about the application of rules of private international law, however, see A. Reinisch (2000:
51).
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